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COLD WAR BURDEN-SHARING? 




ABSTRACT. In Nigeria, Britain asserted its post-colonial security role during and immediately 
after the transfer of power, and remained responsible for assisting the Nigerian armed 
forces. While the Americans recognised Nigeria’s potential as an important partner in the 
Cold War, they preferred to focus on development aid. Washington was thus supposed to 
complement British assistance, while leaving the responsibility for the security sector to 
London. But with the escalation of the Cold War in Africa, the Nigerians’ efforts to reduce 
their dependency on the United Kingdom, and Nigeria’s growing significance for the United 
States in African affairs, this Anglo-American burden-sharing was increasingly questioned in 
Washington. The United States thus eventually decided to militarize its aid policy towards 
Nigeria. In analysing the militarization of US aid policy towards Nigeria, this article will, 
firstly, assess the Anglo-American relationship in the early 1960s; secondly, position Nigeria 
in American Cold War policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa; thirdly, question the role of 
military assistance in Washington’s policy towards Nigeria and Africa; and fourthly, 
discover the regional and local factors that influenced policymakers in Washington and 
London. 
 
In assessing Britain’s position in Nigeria in February 1963, less than three years after 
independence, the US ambassador in Lagos praised the British for a smooth transfer of power, 
but also observed that ‘British prestige and, therefore, influence have … been on decline in 
Nigeria ever since independence’. On the one hand, Joseph Palmer II saw this as the inevitable 
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consequence of Britain’s diminishing great power role, the decreasing importance of the 
commonwealth following London’s shift towards Europe, Whitehall’s policies elsewhere in 
Africa, as well as Nigeria’s continued decolonization process after independence. But on the 
other, he observed that while American interest in Nigeria had increased, the Nigerians were 
looking to the United States (US) ‘as their major hope for reducing their dependence on [the] 
U.K.’. Fearful that Lagos might turn elsewhere if Washington was not willing to compensate 
for the British, Palmer concluded that ‘we cannot give a boost to British prestige by holding 
ourselves back’.1 
At this juncture, the US was already Nigeria’s most important national provider of 
foreign aid by having pledged almost twice as much as Britain to its national development 
plan.2 But when it came to military assistance, the Americans were largely absent. Despite 
Lagos’ efforts to diversify its sources of military assistance, it still relied heavily on Britain.3 
The White House had a strong preference for development aid, but from early 1963 it began to 
seriously consider more substantial military assistance to Nigeria. By the time the government 
of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was overthrown by the January 1966 coup, the US was about 
to become responsible for the training of the Nigerian army.4 This was, after the abrogation of 
the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement in early 1962, yet another setback for the British, who 
feared completely losing their influence on the Nigerian armed forces.5 
This shift in US aid policy towards Nigeria allows us, firstly, to assess the Anglo-
American relationship in the early 1960s; secondly, to position Nigeria in American Cold War 
policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa); thirdly, to question the role of military 
assistance in Washington’s policy towards Nigeria and Africa; and fourthly, to discover the 
regional and local factors that influenced policymakers in Washington and London. 
The first question that the militarization of US aid policy towards Nigeria raises is 
whether the Anglo-American relationship in Nigeria was marked by cooperation or, like 
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Franco-American relations in Africa in the early 1960s, by rivalry.6 The late 1950s and early 
1960s have generally been considered a period of revival in the ‘special relationship’ and, 
according to Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, there was no hostile takeover of the 
former British empire by the US. Instead, Washington expanded its influence in partnership 
with the British, who after the Suez Crisis of 1956 teamed up with the Americans to fight the 
Cold War also in the Third World, believing that colonial reflexes would be counterproductive 
in winning over local elites and maintaining informal influence.7 Yet as Nigel Ashton has 
shown, US and British interests and policies also clashed during this period, for instance in 
Africa over the Congo.8 This article will thus assess whether the Congo was the exception to 
the rule, and Washington and London ‘shared the burden’ in Nigeria. 
Anglo-American competition or cooperation inevitably depended on Washington’s 
Cold War policies towards Africa and Nigeria. The globalization of the East-West 
confrontation was slow to spread to Africa, and the superpowers only began to take a closer 
interest in the region with decolonisation gathering pace in the late 1950s. The Soviet Union 
and the US wanted to gain the allegiance of the emerging states to their respective camps.9 The 
administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, which did not attribute any major strategic 
importance to Africa, believed that this could be achieved by relying on Britain and France. 
While Soviet inroads into West Africa raised concern in Washington, it was only in the wake 
of the independence of numerous countries in the ‘Year of Africa’ (1960), the Congo Crisis, 
and the arrival of John F. Kennedy in the White House that Africa’s strategic importance 
increased and the Americans became more active. The Congo Crisis was of particular concern 
to the US, because after being confronted with the secession of the mineral rich Katanga 
immediately after independence, a lack of support from the Eisenhower administration, and a 
largely ineffective United Nations peacekeeping operation, Congolese Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba had turned to the Soviet Union for help. Even though Lumumba was – with the tacit 
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approval, if not support from the US and other western powers – assassinated a few days before 
Kennedy’s move into the White House,10 the new American administration wanted to prevent 
his political heirs from seizing power, and a return of the Soviets, who had been driven out of 
Central Africa after Lumumba’s downfall.11 But despite the transformation of the Congo into 
one of the main Cold War battlegrounds of the early 1960s, Africa remained of secondary 
importance to US policymakers when compared to other world regions.12 Nevertheless, the US 
deployed relatively important resources, and singled out specific African countries, notably 
Nigeria, on which to concentrate its efforts. Nigeria was central to the African strategy of 
Kennedy and his aides. Supposed to be a showcase for Washington’s modernization policy in 
Africa,13 Nigeria became the biggest recipient of US aid south of the Sahara in the early 
1960s.14 This brought Nigeria, according to Bassey E. Ate, into a relationship of dependency 
and alignment with Washington.15 Since development aid seemed to deliver tangible political 
results, this article seeks to answer why the US decided to ‘militarize’ its aid policy to Nigeria. 
The military dimension of Washington’s aid policy towards Nigeria in the 1960s has 
largely gone unnoticed. It has even been argued that the US deferred to Britain on Nigerian 
military affairs.16 This should not come as a surprise, because this is what the Americans had 
done at first; the January 1966 coup in Nigeria led to the cancellation of the planned US military 
assistance programme; Lagos relied on British and Soviet arms supplies during the Nigerian 
Civil War; American arms transfers to Nigeria can only be traced from the 1970s onwards;17 
and finally, US military assistance to Africa was, in comparison to other regions, very modest 
during the 1960s and focused predominantly on East Africa, notably Ethiopia.18 Nevertheless, 
the militarization of US aid policy towards Nigeria predated the transition from British to 
American leadership in military assistance to Kenya in the 1970s,19 and was seen by the 
Nigerian leadership as a means to further reduce their dependency on the British. 
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It was this Nigerian search for alternative sources of military assistance in reaction to 
domestic and regional pressures that triggered the militarization of Washington’s aid policy. In 
line with the ‘postcolonial turns’ in African, Imperial, and Cold War History, this article shows 
how the Nigerian leadership affected the security relationships between Lagos, London, and 
Washington.20 More specifically, it was the Nigerian government’s western-oriented 
neutralism that drove it in the pursuit of reducing its military dependency on Britain, but 
simultaneously prevented it from looking beyond western, neutral, and non-aligned countries 
for alternative sources of military assistance.21 This also helps to explain why the Soviets and 
the Chinese, whose competition for world communist leadership heavily affected Africa,22 only 
played a hypothetical role in this Cold War episode. Research at the National Archives of 
Nigeria in Ibadan and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos, did not unearth 
directly relevant sources providing the Nigerian perspective. But a careful reading of a vast 
body of American and British sources, and an awareness of the potentially incomplete nature 
of (post-)colonial archives and biased discourse of US and British policymakers,23 allows us to 
also grasp Nigerian agency. Moreover, whereas a racially motivated feeling of superiority is 
apparent in the documents of the Eisenhower period, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
seemed to be – despite a patronising tendency and Cold War blinkers – genuine in their support 
towards Nigeria, and the available British sources reflect Whitehall’s esteem for Balewa and 
his closest associates. 
Based on this archival material, the article firstly analyses Washington’s endorsement 
of British pre-eminence in Nigerian security affairs and focus on development aid during the 
transfer of power, and then the process leading to the militarization of Washington’s aid policy 
towards Nigeria from 1963 onwards. Thereby, it argues that for the Americans the decline of 
British influence made the provision of military assistance seem inevitable, a stable and 
western-oriented Nigeria was a cornerstone in the African Cold War, the provision of military 
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assistance was a means of last resort in Africa, and depended on Nigerian requests and 
cooperation. This illustrates the regional and local peculiarities of the Global Cold War, and 
allows the article to contribute to the growing historiographical engagement with Africa’s role 
in the East-West struggle.24 
 
I 
During the transfer of power in Nigeria, the US endorsed Britain’s pre-eminence in Nigerian 
security affairs. The Eisenhower administration was sympathetic towards Nigeria, and 
acknowledged the country’s potential importance for the US and the Western bloc. The 
American position was, however, to support British efforts to maintain its influence and retain 
the Nigerians within the western orbit. US-Nigerian relations became more intensive with the 
Congo Crisis and Kennedy’s arrival in the White House. But whereas the Americans pledged 
substantial development aid, they were not willing to respond to Nigerian enquiries with a 
military assistance programme. 
This reflected the broader pattern of Washington’s African policy during this period. 
Similar to their predecessors in the White House, the Eisenhower administration embarked on 
a ‘middle path’. While it spoke out in favour of African self-determination, it tacitly supported 
the colonial position of its European allies. This provoked anger and frustration in Africa, 
which, in combination with the rise of the Afro-Asian movement and non-alignment, Ghana’s 
independence, and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s Third World offensive pushed 
Washington to pay closer attention to the African continent. This led to the first National 
Security Council paper on Africa in 1957 (NSC 5719), and the creation of a Bureau of African 
Affairs in 1958. Yet Washington’s African policy had not changed, only evolved. Distrustful 
of the ability of Africans to govern themselves, the US was supposed to support its European 
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allies to achieve an orderly transfer of power, and to retain the newly independent states in the 
Western camp.25 
A more significant policy shift only came with Kennedy, who believed that the future 
of the East-West struggle for the Third World was to be played out in Africa. Therefore, and 
in support of African nationalism, he opposed European colonialism, accepted African 
neutralism, launched a charm offensive with African leaders, and initiated aid programs. In line 
with modernization theory and in combination with technical assistance, foreign investment, 
and integrated planning, development aid was supposed to accelerate the transformation of 
traditional societies to the liberal, capitalist, and democratic model of the US. Thereby, newly 
independent African and other Third World states were supposed to be stabilized and sheltered 
from communism.26 Of military assistance it was feared, by contrast, that it would provoke an 
arms race and turn the Cold War ‘hotter’ in Africa. Military assistance was thus limited and 
aimed at strengthening the domestic security and territorial integrity of African states.27 
Moreover, in 1961, US Congress imposed a ceiling of $25 million per year for equipment for 
military assistance programmes in Africa.28 Even though this ceiling was slowly raised from 
the late 1960s onwards, Africa only received a fraction of US arms transfers during the Cold 
War. Whereas between 1950 and 1985 Europe received nearly $230 billion worth of weapon 
supplies, Asia over $120 billion, the Middle East some $95 billion and Latin America about $9 
billion, Africa received a mere $4.5 billion. Washington privileged development aid, and from 
1956 to 1965, it disbursed $2,272 million of economic aid, but only $160.2 million worth of 
military assistance to Africa.29 Thereby, the US was first supposed to play a complementary 
role to that of its European allies in general, and to that of Britain in particular.30 
By the late 1950s, it had become easier for the US to support Britain, because 
policymakers in Whitehall had come to accept decolonization in West Africa. Nigeria was not 
considered fit for independence. But the temporary closing of ranks between the three major 
Military Assistance to Nigeria 
8 
 
and regionally dominated parties – the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the Action Group 
(AG) of the Western Region, and the predominantly Eastern-based National Council of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (NCNC) – rising nationalist sentiment, Ghanaian independence, the 
forthcoming emancipation of French West Africa, and the constitutional process towards self-
government, dramatically reduced London’s options.31 Simultaneously, the British worried for 
their international reputation, and feared that further delaying independence could provoke 
unrest, undermine Nigerian goodwill, and thereby reduce Britain’s influence and open the door 
to communist infiltration. As a result, in the rounds of constitutional talks between 1957 and 
1959, London gave in to the Nigerian demand to set a firm date for independence, which was 
to be in October 1960.32 
Yet the British cabinet only made this commitment once it had secured its strategic 
interests in Nigeria. With overflying and staging rights in the Middle East increasingly 
questioned in the wake of the Suez disaster in 1956 and the Iraqi Revolution two years later, 
the alternative air route through West Africa gained unprecedented strategic importance in 
Britain’s global defence planning. The Kano airfield in Northern Nigeria was considered an 
‘essential link’ on the trans-African air reinforcement route. Defence Minister Duncan Sandys 
and Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd thus obtained a commitment, from the Nigerian 
Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and the regional premiers, to enter into a defence 
agreement with Britain upon independence. In exchange for staging and overflying rights, 
Britain was supposed to provide Nigeria with military assistance.33 
With the responsibility for the development of the Nigerian armed forces in British 
hands, the Americans did not see the need to get involved in Nigerian security affairs. 
Washington had nevertheless fostered a closer relationship with Lagos prior to independence, 
because with the increasing Soviet involvement in West Africa, first in Guinea and Ghana, and 
then in the Congo, the large and populous future state of Nigeria was gaining in importance.34 
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Moreover, the Nigerian leadership, despite its declared foreign policy of non-alignment, was 
clearly pro-Western – while it was seeking aid from the US, it rebuffed Soviet overtures.35 
The British too were hoping for American support. Within the framework of the 
Bermuda Conference in March 1957, during which British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
and Eisenhower restored the Anglo-American relationship in the wake of the Suez Crisis, the 
British foreign secretary met with his US counterpart to get – among other things – American 
backing in Africa. Dulles broadly agreed with Selwyn Lloyd’s view ‘that the battle [against 
Communism] for the next ten years would lie on the continent of Africa’. The US secretary of 
state was particularly disturbed by the planned establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Ghana and the Soviet Union. Therefore, and in reaction to Lloyd’s presentation of the situation 
in British colonies and the path towards independence in Nigeria, Dulles emphasized that the 
US would not exert pressure on Britain to grant ‘premature independence’. The British foreign 
secretary thus concluded that in Africa, unlike the Middle East, the US and Britain should be 
able to work together to keep the communists out.36 
Meanwhile, British policymakers detected signs of American attempts to extend their 
influence in Nigeria.37 With independence on the horizon, the American Consul in Lagos, 
Ralph H. Hunt, met with leading Nigerian politicians to discuss the march towards 
independence, and the potential of communist penetration in Nigeria. In discussions with 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Premier of the Eastern Region and leader of the NCNC, and Obafemi 
Awolowo, the Premier of the Western Region and leader of the AG, he was assured that Nigeria 
was largely immune to communism, and that they were confident that Britain would not delay 
the granting of independence. On the issue of communism, Hunt remained sceptical, 
however.38 In addition, he was told by Balewa ‘that the US must expect Nigeria to swing more 
and more in its direction as the country nears independence’.39 While Nigerian leaders tried to 
present themselves and their future country in a favourable light, they were also actively 
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seeking support from the US. Already in October 1957, the Northern politician and Federal 
Minister of Lands, Mines, and Power, Muhammadu Ribadu, called on Palmer, at the time 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, to ask for economic assistance. While there 
was no communist menace in Nigeria, he argued, financial aid would help protect the country 
from communist incursions in the future. Palmer answered evasively, saying that while US 
assistance was not necessarily related to a communist threat, a Nigerian request for help would 
be carefully considered.40 Yet as the British Governor-General, Sir James Robertson, pointed 
out to Hunt, the Nigerian leadership believed that it was exactly because of the absence of an 
imminent communist threat that its requests for American aid were not duly considered.41 
Robertson thus expressed his hope to the American consul that the US would provide aid to 
Nigeria.42 
The Americans were favourably disposed towards providing aid, not least because 
despite Nigerian assurances to the contrary, their country was considered vulnerable to 
communism and Egyptian pressures. Moreover, Washington had political, economic, and 
strategic interests in Nigeria. According to the US Operations Coordinating Board’s (OCB) 
Operations Plan for Nigeria of July 1958, Nigeria was ‘one of the areas of greatest U.S. interest 
among the dependent overseas territories’. Nigeria was expected to play a major role in West 
Africa and Africa more generally, and seen as a growing market for American exports and 
investments, as well as a reliable source of raw materials. From a strategic perspective, the 
primary interest was to deny communist control, and in the event of war or air and sea barriers 
in the Middle East, it was important to control sea and air communications through Nigeria. 
The US thus had to provide economic and technical assistance to establish friendly relations 
and keep the Nigerians in the western camp. Britain was, however, to remain the lead western 
nation. American departments and agencies were encouraged to assist the British in the orderly 
transfer of power, and promote close relations between Britain and Nigeria after independence. 
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The US was only supposed to complement British efforts and intervene at the levels of 
diplomacy, aid, and propaganda. At the military level, there was no action plan other than 
keeping an eye on developments in Nigeria and its region.43 The emphasis on aid and 
propaganda was confirmed in the OCB’s response of January 1959 to NSC 5818 on US policy 
towards Sub-Saharan Africa.44 This policy was reflected in the tripartite talks between Britain, 
France, and the US on Africa of April 1959, during which the Americans made it clear that 
they envisaged only ‘a modest amount of military assistance’ and were happy to leave the 
defence field to the colonial powers.45 
Nevertheless, in line with the OCB’s Plan, Washington observed the development of 
the Nigerian armed forces, and the evolution of the Anglo-Nigerian security relationship during 
the run up to independence. The gist of most reports was that the Nigerian Army would be able 
to maintain law and order in cooperation with the police, but not to defend the country. Since 
there was no external threat, this was not necessarily a problem. The real issues for US 
observers were tribalism and Nigerianization. On the one hand, it was feared that tribal and 
regional politics could undermine the army’s efficiency. On the other, as a result of the slow 
pace of Nigerianization, the Nigerian army and navy remained dependent on British officers. 
But ultimately, the Americans saw the Nigerian security forces, and the British role therein in 
a favourable light.46 They were aware that the Anglo-Nigerian defence relationship was not 
unproblematic. Azikiwe (NCNC) and Awolowo (AG) voiced their discomfort with the planned 
Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement – not for anti-Western reasons, but anti-colonial and 
domestic political issues.47 The Governor-General thus felt obliged to assure the American 
Consul that the majority of the Nigerian leadership would stand by their promise to enter into 
a defence agreement upon independence.48 For as long as the British seemed to be in control, 
Washington did not see a need to get directly involved in Nigerian security affairs. 
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This approach was again confirmed on the eve of independence by NSC 6005/1, the 
‘Statement of U.S. Policy toward West Africa’ of 9 April 1960. Despite the growing political 
significance of West Africa, and independence providing an opportunity for communism, the 
US was to leave the main responsibility for the region to the former metropoles, and mainly 
complement their aid efforts. Military assistance was, however, the undisputed prerogative of 
the former colonial powers. Washington aimed to ‘[d]iscourage the development of an arms 
race in Africa and of the concept that the United States is prepared to provide military assistance 
to any nation which requests it’. American military assistance was only to be considered if the 
metropole was unable to provide such assistance and US interests were at stake. As for Nigeria, 
there definitely seemed to be no urgency, since it was considered ‘a potential force for political 
moderation’ among African nations.49 Thereby, NSC 6005/1 not only confirmed previous 
policies but also the earlier assessments of the regional importance of Nigeria.50 The unfolding 
crisis in the Congo further increased the importance of Nigeria to the US, because Lagos was 
willing to provide troops for the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) after 
independence, and to allow the United Nations to use Kano airfield as a staging ground.51 
Balewa was the ideal African partner for Washington in the Congo. On the one hand, his 
staunch anti-communism made him oppose Patrice Lumumba and later his heirs. On the other, 
he could not tolerate a secessionist Katanga because of Nigeria’s own potential for internal 
conflict.52  
Immediately after Nigeria’s accession to independence in October 1960, the Nigerian 
Prime Minister was thus received by President Eisenhower. Balewa confirmed American 
expectations by emphasizing Nigeria’s potential leadership role in African affairs, his pro-
western attitude, dislike of the Soviet Union and communism, and his hope for US aid so as to 
avoid turning to the Soviets. In sum, in contrast to Guinea and Ghana, he portrayed his country 
in a favourable light while nevertheless asking the Americans to work towards an easing of 
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Cold War tensions. Eisenhower was willing to discuss this and other issues, such as the seating 
of the Chinese communists in the UN, but remained non-committal by emphasizing in relation 
to ‘immature nations’ that ‘you cannot make a tree grow overnight’.53 
The foundation of Washington’s policy towards Nigeria had been laid by the end of 
Eisenhower’s term. While the British were supposed to keep the lead on Nigeria and be 
responsible for military assistance, the US would provide development aid. This was perfectly 
acceptable for the financially overstretched British. During his visit to Nigeria in January 1960, 
Macmillan had told ministers of the Western Region, for instance, that he saw a role for the US 
(and West Germany) in external aid.54 The British did not see their position in Nigeria 
threatened by the Americans, and even helped them obtain Nigerian consent for the 
establishment of a tracking station at Kano for NASA’s space satellite project Mercury in 
1959.55 This burden-sharing approach towards Nigeria, with Britain in the leading role, was 
also accepted by the incoming Kennedy administration. The only tangible difference at first 
was the desire to step up development aid. 
In mid-May 1961, Walt W. Rostow, the Deputy National Security Adviser, addressed 
the issue of cooperation with Britain and France in Africa, in a memorandum to his superior, 
McGeorge Bundy. The British and the French, wrote Rostow, were ‘still bearing a primary 
responsibility’ in Africa, ‘but the U.S. is being drawn increasingly into African affairs’. 
Therefore, the President wanted a common western strategy to ‘create islands of 
responsibility’, notably in Nigeria; to prevent incursions by communists in areas where 
revolutionary forces provided them with an opportunity; and to commonly address the issue of 
protracted decolonization.56 In the Nigerian case, this led first to a more active development 
aid policy, starting in May 1961 with the visit of a special US economic mission to Nigeria. In 
its report, the mission wholeheartedly recommended stepping up American development aid 
to Nigeria, because not only was it looking to the West, but it had the unique advantage on the 
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African continent that it could ‘achieve economic development in a democratic framework’. It 
was thus, the report concluded, ‘in the West’s interest generally, and in the U.S. interest 
particularly, to facilitate the growth of the Nigerian economy in the context of free 
institutions’.57 The matter received a certain urgency when a Nigerian economic mission visited 
the communist countries of Czechoslovakia, Poland, China and the Soviet Union. Thereafter, 
the mission also visited the US, where it was received by the President, whose administration 
was anxious to match the receptions by the communist countries that the Nigerians had 
previously visited.58 As a consequence, the US rapidly evolved into a major donor of Nigeria, 
and the Nigerians became one of the prime African recipients of US aid. While in December 
1961 the US pledged $225 million to Nigeria’s six-year plan, by 1963 Nigeria formed with the 
Congo, Liberia, Morocco, and Tunisia a select group of countries that received 55 per cent of 
the total of US aid to Africa of $540 million.59 Moreover, within this group Nigeria, together 
with Tunisia, received the lion’s share.60 
Although the US saw its role in development aid, the July 1961 visit of Balewa to 
Washington, and the increasing unpopularity of the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement in 
Nigeria, raised the spectre of US military assistance. But the American and British governments 
agreed that if Balewa should ask Kennedy for military aid, as their representatives in Lagos 
suspected, they would first have to discuss how British assistance could be complemented.61 
London was assured that the US had no wish to ‘poach’.62 Washington wanted to increase US 
influence, but not at the expense of Britain.63 The position paper on military assistance for 
Balewa’s visit thus made it clear that for political reasons ‘any Nigerian request’ was to be 
approached ‘in a forthcoming spirit’, but the Nigerians would be informed that the Americans 
would first have to take this up with the British.64 Moreover, rather than promoting an arms 
race, the aim was to get Balewa on board for Washington’s arms limitation plans in Africa.65 
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Eventually, while the Nigerian prime minister stated that Nigeria did not need external 
defence aid, his Foreign Minister, Jaja Wachuku, asked whether the US would provide 
assistance for a Nigerian air force. The Americans informed the British, however, that they had 
discouraged the Nigerians ‘about the chance of prestige assistance of this kind’.66 Moreover, 
London was aware that Washington preferred the Nigerians to spend their money on 
development, rather than on defence in reaction to Ghana’s military build-up.67 But changes in 
Washington’s attitude towards Africa, frustration with Nigerian development, the decline of 
Britain’s security role, domestic crises in Nigeria, regional tensions, and a more assertive 
Nigerian leadership would eventually lead to a militarization of US policy. 
 
II 
American enthusiasm for Africa already began to ebb before Kennedy’s assassination. The 
Congo crisis brought home the risks of a heavier involvement in African affairs, the 
engagement with African leaders did not produce the expected political dividends, the Bureau 
of European Affairs and its allies in the White House succeeded in restoring Europe’s 
undisputed supremacy in relation to Africa and, as a corollary, Portugal and South Africa 
regained their voice in Washington. Moreover, with the escalation of the US involvement in 
Vietnam, Africa again faded into the background. These trends were confirmed after 
Kennedy’s death in November 1963, because President Johnson did not share his predecessor’s 
enthusiasm for Africa. The US congress was reluctant to approve large aid budgets for Africa, 
and the influence of the Bureau of African Affairs and the Africanists Kennedy had brought 
into his administration decreased. It was thus hoped that Britain and France would continue to 
‘assume the burden’ in Africa.68 
This inevitably also affected the relationship with Nigeria. In addition to their 
traditional disgust for the treatment of African-Americans in the US, both the Nigerian people 
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and policymakers took issue with Washington’s close relationship with Lisbon and Pretoria. 
While the South African apartheid regime and Portuguese colonialism were an insult to their 
beliefs, Lagos had to publicly condemn the US collusion with white supremacists and 
colonialists to burnish its leadership credentials in African affairs. Moreover, the proliferation 
of American activities in Nigeria, ranging from the extensive deployment of the US Peace 
Corps to US Information Agency propaganda, and the slow disbursement of aid could at times 
be a thorn in the relationship. Nevertheless, Lagos continued to cooperate with Washington in 
and over the Congo, and despite stressing its neutralist foreign policy, it continued to advocate 
for moderation in inter-African affairs. Therefore, and spurned by the trade agreement that 
Lagos had concluded with Moscow in July 1963 to burnish its neutralist credentials, the US 
still saw Nigeria as an important partner in Africa, and continued to provide substantial 
development aid despite disappointing growth figures.69 Meanwhile, however, it seemed 
increasingly unrealistic to leave the leadership of Nigerian security affairs to Britain. 
After opposition to the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement had escalated, the British 
and Nigerian governments agreed to abrogate it in January 1962, and thereby protect the pro-
British Balewa government. Despite a written promise by Balewa to uphold the major 
provisions of the agreement, the defence relationship between Britain and Nigeria rapidly 
deteriorated.70 Under the aegis of Ribadu, now Defence Minister and seemingly anti-British, 
the Nigerian military turned to other sources of military assistance, most prominently to West 
Germany for the air force, and India for the military academy. With the accelerated pace of 
Nigerianization in the army and the navy, Britain thus feared being entirely cut out from 
Nigerian defence.71 Meanwhile, the Nigerian Army assumed an increasingly important role in 
domestic politics because of escalating regional and tribal tensions. During the 1964 elections, 
for instance, the army was deployed to maintain law and order – notably in the Tiv Division in 
Northern Nigeria and the Western Region.72 In light of Britain’s declining defence role and the 
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deteriorating security situation in Nigeria, the Americans began to seriously consider the 
provision of military assistance. 
Washington’s response to Nigerian calls for military assistance was slow and 
incremental. In addition to the partnership with the British, this reflected disagreements within 
the US administration and conflicting signals from Lagos. From early 1962 to the end of the 
First Nigerian Republic in January 1966, the Americans first agreed to a token of military 
training in the US, then an expansion of this training programme and, finally, to send an army 
training team to Nigeria. Had it been the decision of the US defence establishment, this process 
would have been speeded up considerably. Already in late January 1962, the joint chiefs of 
staff called for a military assistance program to Nigeria, alongside the Entente states (Côte 
d’Ivoire, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey), Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. This aid to 
western-oriented West African countries was supposed to act as both a deterrent and an 
inducement to the ‘radical’ countries of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.73 Since this was not in line 
with Washington’s policy towards West Africa and Nigeria, the Bureau of African Affairs 
succeeded in preventing such a dramatic step. American support was to be limited to a few 
training spaces for Nigerian officers in US service schools. The Nigerians were not to be 
encouraged to look to the US for military assistance, and it had to be made clear to both the 
British and them that there would be no military assistance programme. Rather, the Nigerians 
were to be encouraged to continue to look to Britain for military assistance or, as an alternative, 
to other Commonwealth countries, notably India, Pakistan, and Canada.74 
The Americans remained in close consultation with the British. In summer 1962, they 
were informed that the Nigerians were increasingly unresponsive to London’s offers of military 
assistance, and in search of alternative sources. Nevertheless, Whitehall reassured them that 
the Nigerians would eventually come back.75 But behind closed doors, the British were 
worried, and even reluctant to share with the Americans intelligence that could present Anglo-
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Nigerian relations in an unfavourable light.76 In reaction to Ribadu’s dismissive attitude 
towards British military assistance offers, it was feared in London that Britain could be forced 
out of the Nigerian security ‘market for good’.77 By spring 1963, the British military attaché in 
Lagos concluded that the Nigerian defence minister was anti-British, and was therefore 
‘deliberately going to other nations for assistance’. In reaction to suspicions of Ghanaian 
involvement in the Togolese coup of January 1963, Ribadu wanted to strengthen the Nigerian 
armed forces for regional and not, as the British and Americans would have preferred, for 
domestic purposes. Thereby, he looked to Washington and Bonn, instead of London.78 
Washington was increasingly concerned about domestic security in Nigeria, especially 
after the discovery of plans of a coup by supposedly Soviet and Ghanaian sponsored members 
of the AG led to the imprisonment of Awolowo and a crisis in the Western Region in 1962. 
Against the background of decreasing British influence, the US thus began to review its 
position on military assistance. The Americans wanted to assess with the British the security 
situation in Nigeria, and how they could best play a complementary role in strengthening the 
Nigerian security apparatus.79 Even from within the Bureau of African Affairs, which had 
consistently favoured development over military aid, came calls for a heavier military 
involvement. In January 1963, following a recommendation of the US Army’s African 
Division, Ambassador William C. Trimble, the Director of the Office of West Coast and Malian 
Affairs, expressed his hope for an increase in the training program for Nigerian military 
personnel.80 This went in parallel with his lobbying inside the administration for a general 
increase in aid to Nigeria, which with $53.8 million for 1963 was already the major recipient 
of American development aid in Africa.81 The ‘moderate’ Nigeria was considered key to US 
policy in Africa, and the British did not have the means to secure the Nigerians’ western 
orientation on their own.82 Following his trip to Nigeria, US Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs G. Mennen Williams largely supported this view. Although he did not want to 
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encourage a military build-up in Africa and wished to defuse tensions between Ghana and 
Nigeria, he recommended to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs George C. McGhee a stronger supplementary role of the US in Nigeria to 
strengthen the position of the West.83 
The issue was brought up in the Anglo-American talks in London of December 1962 
and, as a result, the US ambassador assessed the internal security situation in Nigeria with the 
British high commissioner in Lagos. During their meeting in spring 1963, Palmer was reassured 
by the British General Officer Commanding of the Nigerian army, Major General Christopher 
E. Welby-Everard, that the Nigerian security forces were able to maintain law and order for 
the foreseeable future. This ability was, however, threatened by the rapid pace of 
Nigerianization, tribalism, and the further loss of British influence.84 In London, it was believed 
that this exchange had been sufficient to reassure the Americans.85 This was overly optimistic, 
because in Washington the training of Nigerian officers in American schools was not only seen 
as a means to foster closer relations, but also to ‘demonstrate to the Nigerians that we appreciate 
their desire not to depend solely on the British’.86 
Towards the end of 1963, coinciding with the death of Kennedy, US policymakers had 
reached a consensus that it was in the US’ best interest to step up its military assistance to 
Nigeria. According to the National Strategy for Nigeria of November 1963, Washington was 
supposed to respond favourably to ‘Nigerian requests for increased training programs’. This 
was supposed to reinforce American influence, compensate for Britain’s declining role, and to 
strengthen internal security in Nigeria.87  The Americans did not want to encourage the 
Nigerians to look to the US for military assistance and were worried that military expansion 
could come at the expense of development. But wary that Lagos could turn to the Eastern bloc, 
they did not see any option other than responding more favourably to Nigerian requests – as 
they explained almost apologetically to the British in early 1964. The British came to accept 
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this policy, because they preferred ‘Nigerians crossing the Atlantic than going to certain other 
countries’.88 
In early 1964, the provision of military training to Nigerians in the US was thus 
extended.89 In addition, Washington agreed to largely symbolic arms supplies, such as a limited 
number of recoilless rifles and carbines.90 This remained unchanged for the remainder of the 
year, even though there were renewed calls for an increase in US military assistance to Nigeria. 
But this time it was not for Nigeria’s, but the Congo’s security. Confronted with the withdrawal 
of ONUC in June, Washington wanted the Nigerians to retain army and police forces in the 
Congo to support the government in Leopoldville. At first, in addition to diplomatic 
interventions, including a letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Balewa, the idea was 
to finance the continued presence of Nigerian forces in the Congo.91 But in light of Nigerian 
reluctance and lack of military capacity, Deputy Assistant for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey 
Kitchen and Defense Secretary Robert McNmara advocated extending US military assistance 
to Nigeria.92 Yet the effectiveness of military assistance for Nigerian peacekeeping was 
questioned by the American embassy in Lagos93 and, eventually, the Nigerians agreed to 
remain in the Congo without additional military assistance. 
Meanwhile, in light of the mounting political tensions in Nigeria between the main 
regionally dominated parties and within the Western Region, by late 1964 Washington had 
shifted its focus back on domestic security, and the related threat of Sino-Soviet penetration.94 
The situation seemed sufficiently severe for Washington to justify an extension of its military 
assistance to Nigeria. The main aim was to strengthen internal security, and thereby help 
maintain national unity and prop up the pro-western Balewa regime.95 In Washington, it was 
soon realized that it was not only a question of whether it was willing to offer a military 
assistance program, but also if the Nigerians actually wanted one. 
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In light of its declared non-alignment policy and negative experience with the Anglo-
Nigerian defence agreement, the Balewa government was reluctant to engage in a substantial 
and thus visible military relationship with the western superpower.96 Moreover, while the 
Nigerians looked up to the US, they were also frustrated with its slow disbursement of aid and, 
especially, domestic racial tensions and cosying up to the South Africans.97 According to the 
UK high commission in Lagos, the US had ‘a poor image in Nigeria and is often clumsy in her 
diplomacy’. Therefore, it was observed, ‘American influence counts for comparatively little 
here compared to our own’.98 The British perception was not only exaggerated, but also self-
flattering, especially in light of Balewa’s praise for Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ program.99 
Nevertheless, in July 1965, the Nigerian Government did not take up Washington’s offer of a 
Combat Intelligence Training Team for the Nigerian Army.100 
By that time, however, the Nigerian position towards American, and even British 
military assistance had already begun to change. In the wake of Ribadu’s sudden death in May 
1965, and his replacement by Inuwa Wada, the Americans and the British were informed about 
a change of policy. During the summer, Sule Kolo, the Permanent Secretary at the Nigerian 
ministry of defence, not only visited Britain to enquire about the supply of seaward defence 
vessels and training assistance,101 but also told the American deputy chief of mission (DCM) 
in Lagos that Nigeria increasingly wanted to turn to the US and Britain for military assistance. 
Yet such assistance had to be discreet, in order not to ‘attract accusations of Western 
imperialism … by certain OAU [Organization of African Unity] countries which would be 
harmful to both sides’.102 According to the British high commission, with which the DCM 
raised the apparent policy shift, the change ‘was more one of atmosphere than of any intention 
to request significant assistance’.103 This was perhaps true in the British case, but Kolo made 
it quite clear to the Americans that his government’s long-term plan was to enter into a closer 
defence relationship with the US, but this required a more favourable domestic climate.104 
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This did not preclude the Nigerians from seeking more US military assistance in July 
1965. Instead of welcoming a Combat Intelligence Training Team, Nigerians would participate 
in the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program through training in the US. Moreover, Kolo 
enquired about the possibility of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) for Nigeria, 
similar to that for Ethiopia, one of Washington’s major beneficiaries of military assistance in 
Africa.105 In early autumn, the State Department decided to respond favourably to this request, 
‘and to send an army survey team to Nigeria to determine in detail the US training role’. From 
a political perspective, this was seen as a means to retain Nigeria as a moderate friend in Africa, 
and to strengthen the Balewa regime, not only domestically, but also vis-à-vis Ghana.106 
Strategically, it was considered in the US’ interest to strengthen the defence relationship with 
Nigeria, because it ‘was one of the most advanced nations in Central Africa, and whose 
strategic location is of considerable importance’, and it would provide – in addition to Ethiopia 
and Liberia – a third area of influence across Central Africa.107 
The Americans, as they explained to the British, did not want to substitute Britain, but 
to complement British and German military assistance to Nigeria in coordination with London 
and Bonn.108 The British believed the Americans. Instead of voicing their anger to Washington, 
they were disappointed by Lagos. Arthur Bottomley, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, thus asked the Nigerian minister of defence why he had turned to the US for the bulk 
of army training. The less than satisfying, and almost sarcastic answer by Wada was that if the 
Nigerians ‘came to Britain for everything, they would only overload our resources’.109 
Moreover, by stating that Nigeria’s real problem was the navy, he asked Bottomley for a naval 
training team.110 The British were eager to comply with this request, because with the air force 
in German hands, and the army now seemingly in those of the Americans, this was the only 
service in which Britain could hope to retain a substantial degree of influence.111 
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Yet Britain’s decline in Nigerian security affairs seemed confirmed, and this was 
indicative of Britain’s rapidly diminishing global role. In light of the imminent British 
withdrawal from east of Suez, the West Africanists in the state department predicted that this 
would also affect Britain’s position in Africa as a whole.112 As a result, West African countries 
would increasingly look to the US as an alternative source for military assistance, and Nigeria 
was indicative of this trend.113 More specifically, Lagos had turned to Washington for military 
assistance because it did not want to be ‘overly dependent on any one country’; after ‘having 
too rapidly phased out British officers … it would be an admission of defeat to ask the UK to 
reassume its former role’; and ‘the Nigerians may think that they can get more from the US 




The militarization of US aid policy towards the First Nigerian Republic lends support to the 
thesis of Louis and Robinson that the British Empire ‘was transformed as part of the Anglo-
American coalition’.116 In Nigeria, Washington and London cooperated, because they both 
followed a Cold War agenda, which aimed to keep independent Nigeria in the western camp. 
For as long as the British seemed to be in control and the Nigerians did not seem at risk of 
falling prey to communism, the Americans were happy to leave them with the prime 
responsibility for Nigeria. The US wished to play a complementary role, and aware of Britain’s 
persistent financial difficulties, aimed to strengthen the western position in Nigeria through 
development aid. Only after the anti-colonial reflexes of the Nigerian opposition and people 
pushed the Balewa government to seek alternative sources of military assistance, and domestic 
instability, regional tensions, and a communist offensive seemed to make Nigeria vulnerable 
to Sino-Soviet advances, did Washington decide to militarize its aid policy. Whitehall would 
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certainly have preferred to retain its predominant role in Nigeria. But similar to the American 
ambassador in Lagos, British policymakers realised that their loss of influence was inevitable. 
As the good cold warriors that they were, they preferred that the Nigerians turn to the 
Americans, rather than to a hostile power. 
Washington too would have preferred the continued reliance of Nigeria on Britain for 
military assistance. As much as Nigeria was considered a key state in the region, and despite 
the Kennedy administration’s courting of African leaders, the Americans were reluctant cold 
warriors in Africa. The Congo Crisis had put them off from a heavier involvement, they were 
increasingly absorbed by more pressing issues in other regions – notably in Southeast Asia – 
and, despite its domestic troubles and potentially pro-Soviet neighbours, there was no acute 
communist threat to Nigeria. Yet most importantly, Washington never considered Africa of 
prime strategic importance. This, in combination with the limited communist military threat, 
the remaining influence of the former colonial powers, and the Kennedy administration’s belief 
in modernization as the best way to immunize newly independent states against communism, 
explains Washington’s predilection for development, instead of military aid. The US wanted 
to avoid a militarization of the Cold War in Africa, and only reluctantly militarized its aid 
policy towards Nigeria. US military assistance in Africa did not follow commercial objectives, 
and focused on key security partners like Ethiopia. As the Congo and later crises in Southern 
Africa and the Horn illustrated, the Soviet-sponsored threat had to be acute to bring about a 
heavier military involvement.117 Yet even then, US military assistance to Africa remained 
negligible when compared to other world regions. 
In Nigeria, US military assistance was triggered, and its extent also determined by 
Nigerian policymakers. It was their search for alternative sources of military assistance that 
allowed the Americans to enter the Nigerian defence market. Moreover, the fear of 
compromising their position in the Cold War and African affairs, their proclaimed non-aligned 
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foreign policy, and domestic opposition, made the Nigerians wary of extensive and thus visible 
American military assistance. Nigerian agency was also important when the 1966 January coup 
brought the British-trained Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi to power, who favoured a more 
prominent British role in Nigerian security affairs. Fearful of becoming embroiled in Nigeria, 
the Americans seized this opportunity to shelve their half-hearted plans for a MAAG, and 
hoped the Nigerians would rely again on the British.118 The American position did not change 
when half a year later another coup brought the Sandhurst-trained Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu 
Gowon to power.119 During the ensuing Nigerian Civil War, the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations even imposed and upheld an arms embargo on both sides and left it to Britain 
to safeguard Western interests in Lagos.120 
During the first decade of African independence, the US was – in contrast to the 1970s 
– reluctant to get more heavily involved in Africa. In order to forestall communist advances, 
Washington preferred, whenever possible, to rely on the former colonial powers, which 
retained influence in this world region. Even though the French position increasingly eclipsed 
that of Britain, London was still a security player in postcolonial Africa. The influence of 
external powers was, however, dependent on developments on the ground and the collaboration 
of local elites. Africa’s Cold War was thus heavily affected by regional, local, and post-colonial 
factors. 
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